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comes effective. The determination of the question again appears to
lie in the purpose of the requirement. If it can be said that the purpose
is only to give constructive notice to those who may be affected, then
actual knowledge would certainly be a binding substitute. On the other
hand, the scope of the requirement may be greater, necessitating filing
as a final step in the rule making process. The express separation of
the filing and publishing requirements lends support to such an argument.
The federal picture remains uncertain, but it is suggested that the
Aarons case correctly interprets the filing and publication requirements under APA § 3(a) (3) and FRA § 5.41 Further, it seems correct
to say that APA § 4 (a) requires publication of notice of proposed rule
making as a prerequisite to the passing of a valid rule. Only future
litigation can verify these conclusions but they are supported by the
most logical interpretation of the purpose of these sections.
RALPH HAWKINS

CREDITOR'S RIGHTS
Bankruptcy-Section 70(c) -Actual
Creditor Required. In
Pacific Finance Corp. v. Edwards' the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit interpreted § 70(c) of the Bankruptcy Act' to
mean that the trustee acquires the status of a hypothetical lien creditor
only if there is an actual creditor who could have acquired a lien on the
date of the petition in bankruptcy.
The debtor purchased a Cadillac automobile on a conditional sale
contract, after which the automobile title and the sale contract were
immediately transferred to appellant Pacific Finance Corporation. The
contract was filed with the county auditor two days after its execution,
but through a mutual mistake the contract was dated October 10, 1959,
instead of its real date of execution, November 10, 1959. On April 1,
41 The Hotch case is still good law in the Ninth Circuit and there are indications
that it has been accepted in the Fourth Circuit. See Graham v. Lawrimore, 185 F.
Supp. 761 (1960), aff'd on other grounds, 287 F.2d 207 (1961). Another case contrary
to the views expressed in the Hotch case is Eastern Airlines v. Union Trust Co.,
221 F.2d 62 (1955) (cited by the Aarons court).
'304 F.2d 224 (9th Cir. 1962).
2 "The trustee, as to all property, whether or not coming into possession or control
of the court, upon which a creditor of the bankrupt could have obtained a lien by
legal or equitable proceedings at the date of bankruptcy, shall be deemed vested as
of such date with all the rights, remedies, and powers of a creditor then holding a
lien thereon by such proceedings, whether or not such a creditor actually exists."
30 Stat. 565 (1898), 11 U.S.C. §ll0(c) (1952).
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1960, adjudication in bankruptcy occurred. The court found that
no one had extended credit to the bankrupt after the execution of the
conditional sale contract for the Cadillac.
Under the Washington conditional sale contract recording statute,3
the title of the conditional vendee is absolute as to all subsequent
creditors unless the instrument is filed within twenty days after the
vendee takes possession. The parties agreed that under Washington
law the instrument could not be reformed. 4 Since late filing could not
cure the defect and the lien of the conditional vendor under Washington
law' was void as to those who extended credit after the late filing, the
trustee contended that he obtained the status of a hypothetical creditor
with a lien at the date of the filing of the petition in bankruptcy under
§ 70(c) of the Bankruptcy Act' and that, therefore, the lien of appellant was ineffective against the appellee trustee.
The court of appeals denied the right of the trustee to set aside the
lien, saying that "creditor" as used in § 70(c) means "actual creditor"
and "that the clause 'whether or not such a creditor actually exists'
refers only to a 'creditor then holding a lien thereon.' "I The court then
gave its interpretation of the effect of this construction:
Under our construction of §70, sub. c the Trustee is empowered to
exercise the powers given him even if no actual creditor has obtained a
lien, but he cannot do so if no actual creditor could have obtained a lien.
In that instant case... there was in existence at the date of bankruptcy no actual subsequent creditor of the bankrupt who could have
obtained a lien on the Cadillac automobile at the date of bankruptcy."
The court supported this construction by following the reasoning of
the Supreme Court of the United States in Lewis v. Manufacturers
Nat'l Bank.' Since no general creditor has been injured by the defect
in filing there was no reason why the secured creditor should lose his
3 RCW 63.12.010, as amended, Wash. Sess. Laws 1961, ch. 159, § 1, provides that,
"all conditional sales of personal property . . . containing a conditional right to
purchase, where the property is placed in the possession of the vendee, shall be absolute as to all . . . subsequent creditors, whether or not such creditors have or claim
a lien upon such property, unless within twenty days after the taking of possession
by the vendee, a memorandum of such sale, stating its terms and conditions, . . . shall
be filed in the auditor's office of the county, wherein, at the date of the vendee's taking
possession of the property, the vendee resides ... " The 1961 amendment changed
the recordation period from ten to twenty days.
4 Malott v. General Machinery Co., 19 Wn.2d 62, 141 P.2d 146 (1943).
5 See statute cited note 3 supra.
6 30 Stat. 565 (1898), 11 U.S.C. §110(c) (1952).
7304 F.2d at 228.
8 Ibid.
9 364 U.S. 603 (1961).
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preferred position merely because the debtor was an adjudicated bankrupt. Contrary "construction would enrich unsecured creditors at the
expense of secured creditors, creating a windfall merely by reason of
10
the happenstance of bankruptcy.
Section 70(c) of the Bankruptcy Act has often been referred to as
the "strong arm" provision of the Act. 1 The clause received its most
liberal construction in Constance v. Harvey," where the bankrupt
executed to Constance a chattel mortgage which was not recorded
within a reasonable time as required by state law. There were no
creditors existing at the date of actual recordation. Over a year after
the actual filing, the chattel mortgagor was adjudicated bankrupt.
Since the right of a trustee in bankruptcy to set aside a security transaction depends on the laws of the state in which the bankrupt is
located"3 and since in this case state law provided that a belated filing
was good against creditors who became such after the belated filing
but not before, the trustee could find no actual creditor who could have
set aside the mortgagee's lien on the date of filing in bankruptcy. The
court, however, concluded that the lien of the chattel mortgagee was
ineffective against the right of the trustee, reasoning that § 70(c) gives
the trustee the right "to be put in the position of an 'ideal' hypothetical
creditor."'" The trustee thereby acquired the rights and powers of a
hypothetical creditor not only at the date of filing in bankruptcy, but
also at any anterior point in time that would be of best advantage to
him. This would enable the trustee to declare any security transaction
void as to him "if he could conceive of a situation when a general
'OId. at 608-609.
11 In 1910 the trustee was vested with the "rights, remedies, and powers of a
creditor holding a lien by legal and equitable proceedings thereon; and also, as to all
property not in the custody of the bankruptcy court, shall be deemed vested with all
the rights, remedies, and powers of a judgment creditor holding an execution duly
returned unsatisfied." 36 Stat. 840 (1910). This was, however, a part of § 47(a) (2).
In 1938 the Chandler Act removed this "strong arm' provision from § 47(a) (2) to
§ 70, and in so doing made it clear that the trustee's rights, remedies, and powers were
not dependent on any actual creditor with a lien or unsatisfied execution by adding
the clause "whether or 7 not such a creditor actually exists." 52 Stat. 881 (1938). In
64 Stat. 26 (1950), § 0(c) was amended to give the trustee the rights of a hypothetical creditor with a lien by legal or equitable proceedings as to all property
"whether or not coming into possession or control of the court." Finally, Congress, by
66 Stat. 430 (1952), clarified this section to show that the lien of the trustee is meant
to include property in which the bankrupt had an interest or to which the bankrupt
may be vested with title, for the trustee already has title to all the bankrupt's property
and therefore can't have a lien on his own property. 2 U.S. CODE CONGRESSIONAL AND
ADMINISTRATIVE NEWS, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 1976 (1952).

12215 F.2d 571 (2d Cir. 1954).
13 Myers v. Matley, 318 U.S. 622 (1943) ; Holt v. Crucible Steel Co. of America,

224 U.S. 262 (1912) ; 4 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY 1411 (14th ed. 1940).
14 215 F.2d at 575.
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creditor might have existed who could personally, as of the date of
bankruptcy, claim rights superior to those of the secured creditor under
state law.... M5
The Constance decision was criticized by many of the courts who
were subsequently faced with the same problem." Because of this
difference among the circuits in the interpretation of § 70(c), the
Supreme Court granted certiorari in Lewis v. Manufacturers Nat'l
Bank." Here the state law provided that the security instrument
should be filed immediately or it would be ineffective againstthose who
extended credit during the interval between execution of the instrument and its actual recordation. There were no such creditors, and
after the recording of the instrument the debtor was adjudicated a
bankrupt. The Supreme Court held that the trustee acquired his rights
under § 70(c) at the date of bankruptcy, and that these rights were
to be determined as of that date and not at any anterior point in time.
The court reasoned that a construction like that of Constance would
destroy the secured position of some creditors when the applicable
state law had said that no general creditors had been injured. By holding that the trustee's rights were to be ascertained as of the date of
filing in bankruptcy, the court was maintaining the "balance" intended
between secured and unsecured creditors.
The Court, in making its point that the rights of the trustee were to
be ascertained as of the date of bankruptcy, said that "the trustee
acquires the status of a creditor as of the time when the petition in
bankruptcy is filed.. ."' This statement produces an apparent inconsistency between Lewis and Pacific. Literally, the trustee in Pacific
would become a creditor who had extended credit as of the date of
filing of the petition in bankruptcy. The Washington conditional sales
filing statute states that a conditional sale contract not filed within
twenty days is ineffective as to any subsequent creditors.' Therefore,
the trustee could argue that since Lewis made him a creditor at the
date of filing, he is a subsequent creditor within the terms of the Washington statute, and the lien of the conditional vendor is voidable by
Is 49 IhL. BJ. 517 (1961).
16 In re P.T.G. Grain Service, 185 F. Supp. 332 (D.Minn. 1960) ; It re Billings,
170 F. Supp. 253 (W.D. Mo. 1959) ; In re Gondola Associates, Inc., 132 F. Supp. 205
(E.D.N.Y. 1955). The Gondola case arose in the same circuit as Constaice and the
court felt compelled to follow Constance even though they did not agree with the
result or the reasoning.
17 364 U.S. 603 (1961).
's Id.at 607.
19 See statute cited at note 3 supra.
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him. But did the Supreme Court intend the statement to be read
literally? It would seem not.
First, the Supreme Court was concerned with reestablishing the protection to secured creditors removed by the Constance decision.20
Unless the applicable state law determines that there is a general
creditor who has been injured by the defect in filing, there is no reason
to defeat the secured creditor's lien." Such a literal construction of this
passage would defeat one of the major objectives of the Bankruptcy
Act, that of keeping in balance the interests of secured and unsecured
creditors.2 2 Under statutes similar to Washington's conditional sales
filing statute22 a secured creditor's preferred position would be lost
even though no actual creditor has been injured.
Secondly, since the Court in Lewis was concerned with eliminating
the unfair advantage that Constance gave to general creditors and with
bringing the positions of the two classes of creditors back into balance,
it is doubtful whether this statement, read in context, can be given an
interpretation inconsistent with Pacific. The Court was intent upon
overruling the interpretation expressed in Constance, which gave the
trustee his rights as an ideal creditor at any ideal point in time. The
paragraph under consideration was the one that disposed of this interpretation, and the Court was concerned with when the trustee acquired
the rights of a creditor. It was not concerned with making him an
actual creditor. 4
However, it can be argued that the trustee is an actual creditor since
in the course of his administration he accumulates expenses which
must be paid out of the estate. But the trustee's status is not that of
20 "That construction [in the Constance decision] would enrich unsecured creditors
at the expense of secured creditors, creating a windfall merely by reason of the happenstance of bankruptcy." 364 U.S. at 608-609.
21 "The rule pressed upon us would deprive a mortgagee of his rights in states like
Michigan, if the mortgage had been executed months or even years previously and
there had been a delay of a day or two in recording without any creditor having been
injured during the period when the mortgage was unrecorded." Id. at 609-610.
22 "The two basic principles of the Bankruptcy Act, to promote equality of distribution among creditors and to preserve security interests fairly acquired, are of course
directly in conflict." Marsh, Constance v. Harvey-The "Strong-Ar,,n Clause" ReEvaluated,43 CALIF. L. Ray. 65, 68 (1955).
23 See statute cited in note 3 supra.
24 By reading the passage in context, it is evident that the court only had in mind
the time at which the trustee acquired his rights of a hypothetical creditor. "We think
that one consistent theory underlies the several versions of § 70, sub. c which we have
set forth, viz., that the rights of creditors-whether they are existing or hypotheticalto which the trustee succeeds are to be ascertained as of 'the date of bankruptcy,' not
at an anterior point of time. That is to say, the trustee acquires the status of a creditor
as of the time when the petition in bankruptcy is filed. We read the statutory words
'the rights * * * of a creditor [existing or hypothetical] then holding a lien' to refer
to that date." 364 U.S. at 607.
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a general creditor because his expenses have priority and are paid
before general claims. 5 In addition, since these expenses are not
really liabilities incurred by the bankrupt, it is difficult to see how the
trustee can be considered one of the bankrupt's creditors. 6
The effect of the Pacific decision can best be seen by a discussion
of its import on a cross-section of Washington's recordation statutes.
Conditional Sale Contracts. As mentioned above," the failure to
file a conditional sale contract within twenty days after the property
is placed in the possession of the vendee will make the vendee's title
absolute as to all subsequent creditors, whether or not they have a lien.
The construction given § 70(c) by some circuits would allow the
trustee to void the lien of the vendor if the contract is not filed within
the twenty day period, even though no credit has been extended during
the interval between delivery of possession and the date of filing in
bankruptcy. 8
Pacific, however, holds that there must be an actual creditor who
could have obtained a lien at the date of bankruptcy." The construction in Pacific certainly appears to be more in line with the intent of
Lewis. Since the chattel was not yet in the possession of the bankrupt,
prior creditors would not have considered its value in determining
whether to extend credit. Therefore, these creditors could not have
been injured by a defective recordation, and there is no reason to give
them a "windfall" just because the debtor has been forced into bankruptcy.
Chattel Mortgages. The Washington chattel mortgage filing statute
makes any chattel mortgage of personal property void as to all prior
and subsequent creditors, whether or not they have or claim a lien, if
such mortgage is not filed within ten days of its execution. 0 The rule
of the Pacific decision in requiring an actual creditor who could have
obtained a lien will have no effect, for by force of the statute it makes
no difference whether the creditor has a lien, and the mortgage is void
as to both prior and subsequent creditors. Since the statute applies to
2530
28

Stat. 563 (1898), 11 U.S.C. § 104(a) (1952).

0 "On the one hand, the debt, demand or claim must involve a liability of the

bankrupt." 1 COLLmR, BANxKUPTCy 74-75 (14th ed. 1940). (Emphasis added.)
27 See statute and amendment cited note 3 supra.
28I1; re Babcock Box Co., 200 F. Supp. 80 (D. Mass. 1961); In re Luckenbill,
156 F. Supp. 129 (E.D. Pa. 1957); National Oats Co. v. Long, 220 F.2d 745 (5th
Cir. 1955) ; McKay v. Trusco Finance Co., 198 F.2d 431 (5th Cir. 1952).
29 304 F.2d at 228.
30 RCW 61.04.020.
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any possible creditor, and there has to be at least one creditor to have
bankruptcy, § 70(c) would not be needed to give the trustee a lien.
He could proceed to void the mortgagee's lien under § 70(e). 3
The argument was made in Pacific that construing § 70(c) against
the trustee would make it nugatory because it would be identical in
operation with § 70(e).32 This argument is certainly valid when
applied to statutes similar to Washington's conditional sale and chattel
mortgage statutes, where it is immaterial whether the creditor has a
lien. If, however, either of these statutes protected only lien creditors,
and there was a creditor at the date of filing in bankruptcy who could
have obtained a lien but did not, the trustee could then proceed under
§ 70(c) and acquire the rights which such a creditor would have with
a lien. But here the trustee could not proceed under § 70(e), for the
trustee would acquire only the actual rights that the existing creditor
had at the date of filing. This distinction clearly appears from the
following discussion of the Washington bill of sale statute, a discussion
which also demonstrates the practical application of both the Lewis
and Pacific decisions.
Bill of Sale. The Washington bill of sale recordation statute protects
existing creditors who obtain a lien between execution of the bill of
sale and its recording, if such recording is not filed within ten days and
the property is left in the possession of the vendor."
Assume that a bill of sale is executed and the property is left in the
possession of the vendor. The bill of sale is filed more than ten days
after the sale, and a creditor who was owed a debt at the time of the
sale does not acquire a lien prior to recordation. If a petition in bankruptcy is filed after the bill of sale is recorded, then the trustee is
unable to defeat the sale under either § 70(c) or § 70(e). Section
70(e) is unavailable to the trustee because the intervening creditor
failed to get a lien prior to recordation. Under the rule of the Lewis
case, the trustee only acquires the rights of a lien creditor at the time
31 Section 70(e) of the Bankruptcy Act, 30 Stat. 565 (1898), 11 U.S.C. §110(e)
(1952), reads in part as follows: "(1) A transfer made or suffered or obligation incurred by a debtor adjudged a bankrupt under this title which, under any Federal or
State law applicable thereto, is fraudulent as against or voidable for any other reason
by any creditor of the debtor, having a claim provable under this title, shall be null
and void as against the trustee of such debtor."
32 304 F.2d at 230.
33 RCW 65.08.040. In Umbarger v. Berrian, 195 Wash. 348, 80 P2d 818 (1938),
the court construed "existing creditor," as used in the bill of sale statute to mean a
creditor who had acquired intervening rights after its execution and before its
recordation.
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of bankruptcy, and by that date the bill of sale has been perfected so
that no lien creditor can attack it.
However, if the example is altered so that at the date of filing in
bankruptcy there has been no recordation of the bill of sale, then the
outcome is substantially different. Section 70(e) is still unavailable
to the trustee, for the actual creditor did not have a lien as required by
Washington law. But the trustee is successful under section 70(c).
Since there is an actual creditor in existence who could have obtained
a lien at the date of the filing of the petition, the trustee will be
clothed with the same rights which that creditor would have had at
the date of bankruptcy if the creditor had by then acquired a lien.
Therefore, since the bill of sale was not recorded at the date of filing
in bankruptcy and under Washington law a lien creditor at that date
can attack the bill of sale, the trustee will be able to successfully
attack it.
Conclusion. Under the construction given to § 70 by some courts,
the trustee, under the Washington recordation statutes, could set aside
a defectively filed conditional sale contract or chattel mortgage in any
situation.34 However, since the Pacific decision requires that there be
in existence at the date of filing in bankruptcy an actual creditor who
could have acquired a lien, the conditional vendor will not be as vulnerable to attack as before, nor as vulnerable as the chattel mortgagee.
The decision of Pacific is believed to be the correct one, for unless
there is a general creditor who has been injured by the secret lien, the
secured creditor should be allowed to retain his preferred position.
This position has support in other circuits." The rule developed by
Pacific is a needed refinement on the objective of the Lewis decision,
namely, to reestablish the balance between the interests of secured and
unsecured creditors in bankruptcy.
JOHN S. CALVERT
34 In re Dumnont-Airplane & Marine Instruments, Inc., 203 F. Supp. 511 (S.D.
N.Y. 1962) ; In re Luckenbill, 156 F. Supp. 129 (E.D. Pa. 1957) ; McKay v. Trusco
Finance
Co., 198 F2d 431 (5th Cir. 1952).
35
In re P.T.G. Grain Service, 185 F. Supp. 332 (D. Minn. 1960) ; In re Billings,
170 F. Supp. 253 (W.D. Mo. 1959) ; In re Central Connecticut Screw Machine Co.,
168 F. Supp. 718 (D. Conn. 1958). The Billings case was criticized in 57 MicH. L.
Rzv. 1227, 1238 (1959), where the writer said, "Although the result of the Billings
case is sound, it appears that the underlying reasoning is perhaps incorrect. To say
that no hypothetical creditor on the date of bankruptcy could avoid the chattel mortgage because no rights of actual creditors intervened in the interim is to say that the
trustee's rights under section 70c are derivative rights, dependent on the existence of
actual creditors. This is clearly contrary to the statute."

